Abstract-Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, wireless communication is susceptible to adversarial eavesdropping. This paper describes how eavesdropping can potentially be defeated by exploiting the superposition nature of the wireless medium. A Gaussian wire-tap channel with a helping interferer (WTC-HI) is considered in which a transmitter sends confidential messages to its intended receiver in the presence of a passive eavesdropper and with the help of an interferer. The interferer, which does not know the confidential message assists the confidential message transmission by sending a signal that is independent of the transmitted message. An achievable secrecy rate and a Sato-type upper bound on the secrecy capacity are given for the Gaussian WTC-HI. Through numerical analysis, it is found that the upper bound is close to the achievable secrecy rate when the interference is weak for symmetric interference channels, and under more general conditions for asymmetric Gaussian interference channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast and superposition are two fundamental properties of the wireless medium. Due to the broadcast nature, wireless transmission can be heard by multiple receivers with possibly different signal strengths. Due to the superposition nature, a receiver observes a signal that is a superposition of multiple simultaneous transmissions. From the secure communication point of view, the two properties are interwoven and pose a number of security issues. In particular, the broadcast nature makes wireless transmission susceptible to eavesdropping since anyone within the communication range can listen and possibly extract information. A helper can pit one property of the wireless medium against security issues caused by the other. In this paper, we consider the case in which a helper functions as an interferer to improve the secrecy level of a communication session that is compromised by a passive eavesdropper. This phenomenon illustrates that superposition can enhance security.
As depicted in Fig. 1 , we study the problem in which a transmitter sends confidential messages to an intended receiver with the help of an interferer, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We call this model the wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WTC-HI). Here, it is desirable to minimize the leakage of information to the eavesdropper. The secrecy level, i.e., the level of ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential message, is measured by the equivocation rate. This information-theoretic approach was introduced by Wyner [1] for the wiretap channel problem, in which a single source-destination communication is eavesdropped upon via a degraded channel. Wyner's formulation was generalized by Csiszár and Körner who determined the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages [2] . The Gaussian wiretap channel was considered in [3] . The central idea is that the transmitter uses stochastic encoding [2] to introduce randomness, and hence increase secrecy. In the WTC-HI model, the helper provides additional randomization via stochastic encoding without knowing the transmitted message.
In this paper, we give an achievable secrecy rate for the Gaussian WTC-HI under the requirement that the eavesdropper is kept in total ignorance with respect to the message for the intended receiver. The results show that the interferer can indeed increase the secrecy level, and that a positive secrecy rate can be achieved even when the source-destination channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. We also describe a power control strategy for maximizing the achievable secrecy rate. In addition, we provide a Sato-type upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WTC-HI. Through numerical analysis, we find that the upper bound is close to the achievable secrecy rate when the interference is weak for symmetric interference channels, and under more general conditions for asymmetric Gaussian WTC-HIs.
Related work includes the multiple access channel with confidential messages [4] - [7] , the interference channel with confidential messages [8] , [9] , and the relay channel with confidential messages [10] - [12] . Our achievable scheme can be considered to be a generalization of the two schemes of [6] and [11] . The cooperative jamming scheme of [6] considers the situation in which encoder 2 generates independent Gaussian noise. This scheme does not employ any structure in the transmitted signal. The noise forwarding scheme of [11] requires that the interferer's codewords can always be decoded by the intended receiver which is not necessary in our scheme. In addition, no work describes a computable upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian WTC-HI.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model and problem formulation. Section III states our achievability results. Section IV gives the upper bound. Section V illustrate the results through some numerical examples. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system consists of a transmitter, an intended receiver, a helping interferer, and a passive eavesdropper. The transmitter sends a confidential message W to the intended receiver with the help from an independent interferer, in the presence of passive but intelligent eavesdropper (who knows both codebooks). As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the channel outputs at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper can be written as
for k = 1, . . . , n, where {Z 1,k } and {Z 2,k } are sequences of independent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian noise variables with unit variances. The channel inputs X 1,k and X 2,k satisfy average block power constraints of the form
The transmitter uses encoder 1 to encode confidential message w ∈ W = {1, . . . , M} into x n and sends it to the intended receiver in n channel uses. A stochastic encoder f 1 is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f 1 (x 1,k |w), where x 1,k ∈ X, w ∈ W,
. . , n, and f 1 (x 1,k |w) is the probability that encoder 1 outputs x 1,k when message w is being sent. The helper generates its output x 2,k randomly and can be considered as using another stochastic encoder f 2 , which is specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities f 2 (x 2,k ) with x 2,k ∈ X 2 and
Hence, encoder 1 uses stochastic encoding to introduce randomness and increase secrecy. Additional randomization is provided by the helper and the secrecy is further increased.
The decoder uses the output sequence y n 1 to compute its estimateŵ of w. The decoding function is specified by a (deterministic) mapping φ : Y n 1 → W. An (M, n, P e ) code for the Gaussian WTC-HI consists of two sets of n encoding functions f 1,k and f 2,k , k = 1, . . . , n and a decoding function φ so that its average probability of error is
The secrecy level (level of ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the confidential message w) is measured by the equivocation rate
A secrecy rate R s is achievable for the Gaussian WTC-HI if, for any > 0, there exists an (M, n, P e ) code so that 1 The secrecy defined by equivocation rate is weak and can be strengthened using extractor functions without loss of secrecy rate as shown in [13] .
and
for all sufficiently large n. The secrecy capacity is the maximal achievable secrecy rate.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
In this section, we consider an achievable secrecy rate by assuming that the transmitter and the interferer transmit with powers P 1 ≤P 1 and P 2 ≤P 2 , respectively. We address the power control issue in Subsection III-B.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Theorem 1: The following secrecy rate is achievable for the Gaussian WTC-HI:
where
with g(x) (1/2) log 2 (1 + x),
Proof: We briefly outline the achievability scheme next and omit the details of the proof.
In the scheme, we use two independent Gaussian codebooks. Encoder 1 uses stochastic codebook C 1 (2 nR1 , 2 nRs , n), where 2 nR1 is the size of the codebook, and 2 nRs is the number of confidential messages can be conveyed (R s ≤ R). The 2 nR1 codewords in codebook C 1 are randomly grouped into 2 nRs bins each with M = 2 n(R1−Rs) codewords. In addition, encoder 2 uses codebook C 2 (2 nR2 , 1, n), where 2 nR2 is the codebook size and the whole codebook forms a single bin. To send message w ∈ [1, . . . , 2 nRs ], encoder 1 randomly selects a codeword from the w-th bin to send, and encoder 2 randomly selects a codeword from codebook C 2 to send.
The achievable rate given in Theorem 1 is derived by using the above coding scheme and properly choosing the coding parameter triple (R 1 , R s , R 2 ).
Remark 1:
It is clear that an interference power P 2 can benefit secrecy. In particular, when P 2 is sufficiently large, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved except the case
For comparison, we recall that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel (when there is no interferer in the Gaussian WTC-HI model) is
and positive secrecy rate can be achieved only when a < 1.
B. Power Control
Power control is essential to interference management when accommodating multi-user communications. As for the Gaussian WTC-HI, power control also plays a critical role. The interferer may need to control its power so that it does not introduce too much interference to the primary transmission, while the transmitter may want to select its power so that the intended receiver is able to decode and cancel some now helpful interference before decoding the primary transmission.
In this section, we consider a power control strategy for maximizing the secrecy rate given in Theorem 1. We consider the cases with a ≥ 1 and a < 1, respectively. Due to space limitations, we omit the proof.
1) a ≥ 1: Proposition 1: When a ≥ 1, the power control scheme for maximizing the secrecy rate is given by
where P * 1 = b − 1 and
According to Proposition 1, when a > 1, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved when b > 1 or b ≤ a −1 if the interferer's powerP 2 is large enough. When b > 1, the interferer uses its full powerP 2 and the transmitter selects its power to guarantee that the intended receiver can first decode the interference (and cancel it). When b < a −1 , the intended receiver treats the interference as noise. In this case, the transmitter can use its full powerP 1 and the interferer controls its power (below P * 2 ) to avoid excessive interference.
2) a < 1: Proposition 2: When a < 1, the power control scheme for maximizing the secrecy rate is given by
otherwise, where P * 1 = b − 1 and P * 2 is given by (8). When a < 1, positive secrecy rate is always feasible. Here, we consider the cases when the interferer does not help. First, in the case when 1 ≤ b < a −1 , the transmitter needs to hold its power if it wants to let the receiver decode some interference. However, if the transmitter has a large power (P 1 > b−1 1−ab ), it would better to use all its power and request the interferer be silent. In the case when a < b < 1, the receiver treats the interference as noise. If the transmitter does not have enough power (P 1 < b−a a (1−b) ), the interference will hurt the intended receiver more than the eavesdropper.
C. Power-unconstrained Secrecy Rate
A fundamental parameter of wiretap-channel-based wireless secrecy systems is the secrecy rate when the transmitter has unconstrained power, which is only related to the channel conditions. For example, the power-unconstrained secrecy capacity for the Gaussian wiretap channel is given by
After some limiting analysis, we have the following result for the Gaussian WTC-HI model. Theorem 2: When a ≥ 1, the achievable power unconstrained secrecy rate for the Gaussian WTC-HI is
When a < 1, the achievable power unconstrained secrecy rate for the Gaussian WTC-HI is
When the interference is weak (b < a −1 if a ≥ 1, or b < 1 if a < 1), the interference introduces a gain of (1/2) log 2 (1/b). When the interference is strong enough (b > 1 if a ≥ 1, or b > a −1 if a < 1), the power-unconstrained secrecy rate is (1/2) log 2 b. Note that (1/2) log 2 b is the power-unconstrained secrecy rate if the confidential message is sent from the interferer to the intended receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. This is particularly interesting because we do not assume that there is a transmitter-interferer channel (which would enable the interferer to relay the transmission).
IV. SATO-TYPE UPPER BOUND
In this section, we first describe a computable Sato-type upper bound for a general WTC-HI and next evaluate the upper bound for the Gaussian WTC-HI.
It should be noted that the secrecy capacity of the WTC-HI depends only on the marginal distributions P Y1|X1,X2 and P Y2|X1,X2 , and not on any further structure of the joint distribution P Y1,Y2|X1,X2 . In fact, the secrecy capacity is the same for any channel described by PỸ 1,Ỹ2 |X1,X2 whose marginal distributions satisfy
for j = 1, 2 and all y 1 , y 2 and x 1 , x 2 . Theorem 3: Let R u denote a Sato-type upper bound
Then, the secrecy capacity of WTC-HI satisfies
Proof: The proof can be found in the Appendix. The upper bound assumes that a genie gives the eavesdropper's signalỸ 2 to the intended receiver as the side information for decoding message W . Since the eavesdropper's signalỸ 2 is always a degraded version of the combined signal (Ỹ 1 ,Ỹ 2 ), the wiretap channel result [1] can therefore be used. Now we consider the evaluate of (13) for the Gaussian WTC-HI. I(X 1 , X 2 ;Ỹ 1 |Ỹ 2 ) is a function of the transmit power P 1 , P 2 and the noise covariance ρ. Hence, it is denoted as f (P 1 , P 2 , ρ) and is shown to be
For any given ρ, f (P 1 , P 2 , ρ) is an increasing function of both P 1 and P 2 . For any given P 1 and P 2 , f (P 1 , P 2 , ρ) is a convex function of ρ and the minimum occurs when ρ is chosen to be ρ , which is given by
where Therefore, the Sato-type upper bound can be calculated as
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES Fig. 2 shows the achievable rate and the modified Satotype upper bound for a symmetric Gaussian WTC-HI channel (a = b). In this example, we assume thatP 1 =P 2 = 2, and a varies from 0 to 4. The achievable rate R s first decreases with a when a < 1; when 1 < a ≤ 1.73, R s increases with a because the intended receiver now can decode and cancel the interference, while the eavesdropper can only treat the interference as noise; when a > 1.73, R s decreases again with a because the interference does not affect the eavesdropper much when a is large. The upper bound is good for the weak interference case when a ≤ 1. However, when a > 1 and a is large, the upper bound is quite loose because too much information is given to the intended receiver in the genie-aided bound.
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , we present numerical results to show the achievable rate and the modified Sato-type upper bound for the general parameter settings of a and b, where we again assume thatP 1 =P 2 = 2. In Fig. 3 , we show the secrecy rate versus b when a is fixed to be 0.6 and 1.2, respectively. In Fig. 4 , we show the secrecy rate versus a when b is fixed to be 0.2 and 1.2, respectively. Our numerical results show that the Sato-type upper bound is good when ab ≤ 1 (which is consistent with a ≤ 1 for the symmetric case). Note that ab = 1 corresponds to the degraded case, for which the Satotype upper bound is always tight.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the use of the superposition property of the wireless medium to alleviate the eavesdropping issues caused by the broadcast nature of the medium. We have studied a Gaussian wiretap channel with a helping interferer, in which the interferer assists the secret communication by injecting independent interference. We have given an achievable secrecy rate and a Sato-type upper bound on the secrecy capacity. The results show that interference, which seldom offers any advantage for (Gaussian) problems not involving secrecy, can benefit secret wireless communication.
APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem 3:
The secrecy requirement implies that
and Fano's inequality implies that
Based on (16) and (17), we have 
where (18) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (19) follows since W → (X (12) and obtain (13) . Now we evaluate (13) for the Gaussian WTC-HI. We let 
By letting
we have
where (25) follows from the maximum-entropy theorem and both equalities in (24) and (25) hold true when (X 1 , X 2 ) are Gaussian. Furthermore, we have
Hence, I(X 1 , X 2 ;Ỹ 1 |Ỹ 2 ) can be evaluated by (15).
